COMMENTS
PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND THE APPLICABILITY OF
ANTITRUST REMEDIES IN THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY
It has generally been assumed that the independent liner in competition with
a conference of water carriers' has no recourse to the antitrust laws for protection from conference efforts to limit his competition.' His relief, if any, has appeared to depend on the Federal Maritime Board and its interpretation of the
Shipping Act of 1916, 3 which act is said to have superseded the antitrust remedies. Recent decisions, 4 however, have cast doubt upon this view. FederalMaritime Board v. IsbrandisenCo.5 has called the problem into focus by holding that
the Maritime Board may not approve conference agreements filed with it where
the purpose of the agreement is to eliminate a competitor from the trade.
The Shipping Act of 1916 authorizes the Federal Maritime Board to exempt
certain practices of ocean carries in foreign commerce from the operation of
the federal antitrust laws.6 This exemption becomes operative, under the language of the Act, when the practice in question receives the approval of the
Board. Section 15 of theAct provides that operation under an agreement not filed
I A conference is a loose association of steamship lines operating under different flags regularly scheduled vessels over a particular trade route. Each member owns and occasionally
operates his own vessels, and there is pooling of profits. One line may be a member of many
conferences. Most conferences employ an arrangement designed to bind their shippers to ship
exclusively by vessels operated by members of the conferences. These arrangements are sometimes referred to as "dual-rate systems," "contract/non-contract rate systems," or "exclusive
patronage systems." Conference members actually or potentially compete for freight with
tramp vessels, independent non-conference lines, industrial carriers, government operated
ships, and vessels in the United States reserve fleet.
2
United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932); Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 297 U.S. 500 (1936); American Union Transp., Inc. v. River
plate & Brazil Conferences, 126 F.Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y., 1954), aff'd 222 F.2d 369 (C.A.2d,
1955); Wisconsin & Michigan Transp. Co. v. Pere MarquetteL.S., 67 F.2d 937 (C.A.7th, 1933);
Rivoli Trucking Corp. v. American Export Lines, 167 F.Supp. 937 (E.D.N.Y., 1958); Rivoli
Trucking Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 167 F.Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y., 1956), supplemental
opinion rendered 167 F.Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y., 1957); Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 81
F.Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y., 1948), aff'd per curiam sub nom. A/S I. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v.
Isbrandtsen Co., 336 U.S. 941 (1949).
339 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §814 et seq. (1958).
4 Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958) (shipping); United States
v. R.C.A., 358 U.S. 334 (1959) (communications); Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Aircoach
Transport Ass'n, 253 F.2d 877 (App.D.C., 1958) (railroads); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Riss & Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 69,122 (App.D.C., 1958) (railroads).
5356 U.S. 481 (1958).
639 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §814 (1958).
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for approval is violative of the Act. Where such a non-filed agreement has been
judicially attacked as being violative of the antitrust laws, the Supreme Court
7
has held that the district court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action.
The plaintiffs must seek their remedy from the Maritime Board.
The notion of an exclusive primary jurisdiction in the Maritime Board
stems from the Supreme Court decision in United States Navigation Co. v.
C-unard S.S. Co.8 That case involved a suit by a steamship line which was the only
competitor of a conference of carriers carrying ninety-five percent of the cargo
trade from North Atlantic ports to Great Britain and Ireland. The complaint
contained allegations of a combination by the member carriers designed to eliminate the plaintiff from competition. The conference, it was alleged, operated
pursuant to dual-rate contracts with shippers who were penalized by a tariff as
much as one-hundred percent higher for shipping on non-conference vessels.9
The plaintiff sought an injunction against the use of the rate system and against
the combination as a violation of the antitrust laws. The agreement among the
conference members had not been filed for approval with the Maritime Board.
It was urged by the independent line that although section 15 of the Shipping
Act exempted a conference agreement or modification of an agreement from the
antitrust laws, failure to file the agreement or modification gained no exemption
for the conference and left the antitrust remedy open.
The Court, however, refused to accept the approval provision as the demarcation between the operation of the two acts. The charges, the Court noted,
were interrelated with possible violations of the Shipping Act. That Act had
superseded the antitrust laws with respect to water carriers. The independent
was therefore referred to the Maritime Board for his relief, and the complaint
was dismissed. The Court reasoned by analogy to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction as applied to cases involving land carriers before the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Since primary jurisdiction had been judicially developed" with reference to the ICC, notwithstanding the provision in section 22
of the Interstate Commerce Act that the remedies of the Act were in addition to
existing common-law and statutory remedies, a fortiori the doctrine should
apply to water carriers as the Shipping Act contained no such express reservation of remedies.
7 United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932); Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 297 U.S. 500 (1936); Far East Conference v. United States,
342 U.S. 570 (1952).
8 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
1The conference allegedly also employed other means to drive competitors from the trade.
These included: "giving rebates; spreading false rumors and falsely stating that petitioner is
about to discontinue its service; making use of their combined economic bargaining power to
coerce various shippers, who are also producers of commodities used in large quantities by
respondents, to enter into joint exclusive contracts with them; and threatening to blacklist
forwarders and refuse to pay them joint brokerage fees unless they discontinue making, or
advising shippers to make, shipments in petitioner's ships." Id., at 480.
10Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
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At its next opportunity, the Court in Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania
R. Co." amplified its Cunard decision. In a treble damage suit by a shipper
against a railroad the Court relied on its interpretation of the Shipping Act in
Cunardto deny damages under the Commerce Act. This time a further analogy
between the Shipping and Commerce Acts was developed. Section 16 of the
Clayton Act 2 bars injunctive relief to private parties against carriers subject
to the jurisdiction of the ICC, Congress, the Court declared, most likely intended that the policy of the Commerce Act be carried over to the Shipping Act.
Hence, injunctions would not be permitted against water carriers. While damage
actions were not expressly barred by Section 16 of the Clayton Act, it was said
that allowing such an action would permit complainant to "pass over" the
regulatory act and revert to the antitrust laws for the recovery of damages.
Therefore, the treble damage remedy had also been superseded.
Twenty years after Cunard, the Court in Far East Conference v. United
States13 again dismissed on the same grounds an antitrust suit by the government brought against a conference for operating under unfiled dual-rate agreements.
Lower courts have generally understood Cunard, Terminal and Far East as
making the antitrust remedies unavailable against water carriers, 4 for this has
been the practical effect of dismissal of an antitrust complainant by a court when
it defers to the Maritime Board.
It is true that in dismissing, the courts ostensibly employ the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. 5 That doctrine has been said to apply when "problems
11297 U.S. 500 (1936).
1238 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U4$.C.A. §26 (1952).

3342 U.S. 570 (1952).

14 American Union Transp., Inc. v. River Plate & Brazil] Conferences, 126 F.Supp. 91
(S.D.N.Y., 1954), aff'd on opinion of the district judge, 222 F.2d 369 (C.A.2d, 1955); Wisconsin & Michigan Transp. Co. v. Pere Marquette L.S., 67 F.2d 937 (C.A.7th, 1933); Rivoli
Trucking Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n., 167 F.Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y., 1956), supplemental opinion rendered 167 F.Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y., 1957); United States v. Pacific Lumber
Co,. CCH Trade Reg. Rep., 68,474 (N.D.Cal., 1956); United States Trucking Corp. v. American Export Lines, 146 F.Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y., 1956); United States v. Borax Consolidated,
Ltd., 141 F.Supp. 396 (N.D.Cal., 1955); United States v. Alaska Steamship Co., 110 F.Supp.
104 (W.D.Wash., 1952); New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co. v. United States, 36 F.Supp. 190
(E.D.N.Y., 1940), reversing on rehearing 32 F.Supp. 538 (E.D.N.Y., 1940), disapproved, but
appeal dismissed 116 F.2d 799 (C.A.2d, 1940); Swayne & Hoyt v. Kerr Gifford & Co., 14 F.
Supp. 805 (E.D.La., 1935); New York Lumber Trade Ass'n v. Lacey, 245 App. Div. 262,281
N.Y.S. 647 (1935), aff'd per curiam 269 N.Y. 595, 199 N.E. 688 (1935), modified on other
grounds 269 N.Y. 677, 200 N.E. 54 (1936), cert. denied 298 U.S. 684 (1936).
15The decisions in Cunard and Terminal appeared to rest on jurisdictional grounds. But in
Far East the Court discussed and rejected the advisability of a stay rather than dismissal. In
United States v. Pacific Lumber Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep., 68,474 (N.D.Cal., 1956), the
Maritime Board intervened and moved to stay proceedings until it considered the matters
stated in the action. But the court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds on the authority of
Cunard and Far East. Although some antitrust proceedings have been stayed pending the
resolution of administrative questions, courts hearing antitrust shipping cases have uniformly
dismissed.
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which involve expert knowledge of multitudinous detail of intricate nature in a
technical field require that recourse should be had to administrative bodies.
Especially is this true where uniformity of interpretation of rules and consistency in application, in view of an overall policy, is compelled by the legislative mandate."' 6 It is also sometimes said that in antitrust cases primary
jurisdiction allows for a harmonization in the application of two statutes with
variant objectives by two tribunals. 7 But under the usual application of the
doctrine the agency makes a preliminary determination which may or may not
be dispositive of the issues. Supposedly, the plaintiff, if successful before the
agency may resume his original action before the court. In S.S.W., Inc. v. Air
Transport Ass'n of America, s the Court of Appeals explained the procedure as
consisting of a two-step process: after referral to the agency the plaintiff must
show that the defendant violated the regulatory act; only then may he show in
court that the defendant also violated the Sherman Act. If the court finally
awards damages it is only for the violation of the antitrust law and not for the
violation of the regulatory act. 9
But as applied in Cunard and Terminal, it appears that if the plaintiff were
successful before the Board in showing a violation of the regulatory act his relief
lay in the provisions of that act. No return to the district court was contemplated. Where the remedy sought was an injunction as in Cunard,success before
the Board would result in an order to cease and desist from the unlawful activity. If damages were claimed, as in Terminaland in other shipping cases, plaintiff
must look to the reparation provision of the regulatory act for relief.
Several courts have regarded Cunard and Terminal as saying that upon
referral to the Board under primary jurisdiction of a complaint seeking treble
damages, the plaintiff must exhaust his reparations remedy" which is deemed
16Trans-Pacic Airlines v. Hawaiian Airlines, 174 F.2d 63, 66 (C.A.9th, 1949). "[I]n cases
raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the
exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject
matter should not be passed over." Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574
(1952). "If a sufferer from the discriminatory acts of carriers by rail or by water may sue for an
injunction under the Clayton Act without resort in the first instance to the regulatory commission, the unity of the system of regulation breaks down beyond repair." Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 297 U.S. 500, 513 (1936). See Keogh v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922).
- 17 "That some resolution is necessary when the antitrust policy of free competition is placed
beside a regulatory scheme involving fixed rates is obvious." United States v. R.C.A., 358 U.S.
334, 348 (1959). See Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 193 F.2d
230, 234 (App.D.C., 1951); Apgar Travel Agency, Inc. v. International Air Transport Ass'n,
107 F.Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y., 1952); The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 89,
158 (1952).
18 191 F.2d 658 (App.D.C., 1951), cert. denied 343 U.S. 955 (1953).
19 Id., at 664.
20 See S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n of America, 191 F.2d 658, 663 (App.D.C., 1951),
cert. denied 343 U.S. 955 (1953); Trans-Pacific Airlines v. Hawaiian Airlines, 174 F.2d 63, 66
(C.A.9th, 1949); Apgar Travel Agency, Inc. v. International Air Transport Ass'n, 107 F.Supp
706, 711 n.15 (S.D.N.Y., 1952). This is apparently the basis for the decisions in two damage
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an adequate substitute for antitrust damages. But it is a further step to the
belief which seems to be implicit in the invocation of the doctrine by other
22
courts,21 that the whole shipping industry is exempt from the antitrust laws.
It is in the context of the relationship between the Shipping Act and the
antitrust laws that the decision in FederalMaritimeBoard v. IsbrandtsenCo., reinterpreting Cunard and Far East, appears to have significance, particularly
with respect to the future availability of the Sherman Act against the conferences. On appeal from a Board decision approving a dual-rate system similar to
the one present in Cunard and FarEast, the Supreme Court affirmed a reversal
of an approval by the Board. The Court held that the Maritime Board cannot
approve conference agreements having the purpose and effect of stifling the
competition of independent carriers. The dual-rate system was unlawful as a
"resort to other discriminating or unfair methods" under section 14 Third of
the Shipping Act. 23 The Board had argued that such a decision was foreclosed
by Canard and Far East. Had the Court then thought that the agreements
embodying the dual-rate system were unlawful under the Act it would not have
referred the matter to the Board. The Court would originally have declared
them illegal. To this contention the Court replied:
[The Court's action in Cunard and FarEast Con/erence is to be taken as a deferral of
what might come to be the ultimate question... rather than an implicit holding that
24
the Board could properly approve the practices there involved.
Isbrandtsen,seems to represent a retreat from primary jurisdiction as applied
in Cunard. Whereas in Cunard, Terminal and Far East the Court appeared to
relinquish to the agency complete authority to dispose of the issues, Isbrandtsen
appears to take a lesser view of the Shipping Board's authority. Primary jurisdiction is explained as "a device to prepare the way, if the litigation should take
its ultimate course, for a more informed and precise determination by the Court
of the scope and meaning of the statute as applied to those particular circumstances." 2' It is for the Board to determine initially the predatory nature of an
actions dismissed against conferences. American Union Transp., Inc. v. River Plate &
Brazil Conferences, 126 F.Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y., 1954), aff'd 222 F.2d 369 (C.A.2d, 1955);
Rivoli Trucking Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 167 F.Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y., 1956), supplemental opinion rendered 167 F.Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y., 1957).
21
Rivoli Trucking Corp. v. American Export Lines, 167 F.Supp. 937 (E.D.N.Y., 1958);
Rivoli Trucking Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 167 F.Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y., 1956), supplemental opinion rendered 167 F.Supp. 943 (SD.N.Y., 1957); United States v. Pacific
Lumber Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep., 68,474 (N.D.Cal., 1956); United States v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd., 141 F.Supp. 396 (N.D.Cal., 1955); United States v.Alaska Steamship Co.,
110 F.Supp. 104 (W.D.Wash., 1952); American Union Transp., Inc. v. River Plate &
Brazil Conferences, 126 F.Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y., 1954), aff'd 222 F.2d 369 (C.A.2d., 1955).
22 The importance of the step is of course accentuated where unfiled agreements contain
matter which possibly could not be approved by the Maritime Board.
23 39 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §812 (1952).
24356 U.S. 481, 498 (1958).
- Id., at 498-99.
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agreement. But Isbrandtsen emphasizes that referral is made to utilize the
Board's fact-finding capacity as an aid to the court, and not for the independent
disposition of the issues.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Isbrandtsen,attacked the majority holding
as making a "circumlocution office" out of the Board.25 Indeed, the Court had
previously said that the Board had expertise; that uniformity of regulatory
supervision must be preserved; and that the resolution of the divergent policies
of antitrust and the Shipping Act is accomplished by the supersession of the
former. It is now somewhat surprising, declared Mr. Justice Frankfurter, to be
told that the Board may not approve an agreement which it has thoroughly investigated and which it believes to be in the interests of the maritime policy of
the United States. 27 It is more so, as the decision overturns forty years of indus8
try practice on grounds closely resembling antitrust.
Contrary to the broad language of supersession in Cnardand Terminal, the
majority in Isbrandtsen appears unwilling to defer to the Maritime Board an
issue so closely related to antitrust. On the other hand, Mr. justice Frankfurter
views the antitrust exemption provision as indicative of the broad powers of the
Board. There is no doubt in his opinion that the Shipping Act left little of the
antitrust laws applicable to shipping. 29 Of course Isbrandtsendoes not directly
answer the question of the extent of antitrust applicability to shipping conferences. That question was not directly before the Court." But in freeing independent carriers from Board-approved predatory agreements, the decision in
several ways indicates that antitrust may apply.
2 Id., at 518.
27

11r. Justice Frankfurter may have had the statement of Mr. Justice Harlan in United
States v. Western Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 59,65 (1956),particularly in mind. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction "'transfers from court to agency the power to determine' some of the
incidents of such relations." (Emphasis added.)
But the fact that a court permits the expert to make his finding first does not appear to
mean that the court is bound by it. The opinion in Cunard contained references to the "preliminary" jurisdiction of the Board and the injudiciousness of taking jurisdiction "in advance."
In Far East it was a "preliminary" resort; and even elsewhere in Western Pacific (not an antitrust case) the Court spoke of "initial" consideration. See also, New York Susquehanna &
Western R. Co. v. Follmer, 254 F.2d 510 (C.A.3d, 1958), where the court compared a postreferral administrative report with the report of a master.
28 The dual rate appears to have been widely adopted shortly after the passage of the
Shipping Act in 1916. Hearings Before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries on H.R. 12751, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 31 (1958).
Prior to the Act the practice of conferences was to tie shippers to conference vessels by
means of a deferred rebate system. The shipper was to receive a percentage rebate of the
tariff periodically. The conference delayed payment of rebates for several periods. A shipper
choosing to transport by non-conference vessels lost all that was due him. Frequently, the
shipper's rebate also depended on the loyalty of consignees to whom the shipper may have sold
goods during the period of probation. See Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917). Section 14
of the Shipping Act expressly outlawed deferred rebates. 39 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended,
46 U.S.C.A. §812 (1958).
29356 U.S. 481, 512-13 (1958).

10 The contention that it was, was rejected in Riss & Co. v. Association of American Railroads, 170 F.Supp. 354 (D.D.C., 1959).
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The exemption provision in the Shipping Act indicates that the full range of
antitrust shall not apply. But that provision does not eliminate the possibility
that antitrust was intended to apply to situations of non-approval, disapproval
and to situations relating to certain types of approval.
The question of the applicability of the antitrust laws arises when the defense of primary jurisdiction is presented to an antitrust suit. In its most recent
statement on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 3 the Supreme Court considered the answers to three questions of particular importance: (1) Did
Congress in enacting the regulatory statute intend to limit the applicability of
the antitrust laws; (2) Is there an all-pervasive scheme of regulation; (3) Is
there a question of rate-making or rate regulation involved?
The 1913 Report of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries32 is the
flist legislatively significant event in the history of the Shipping Act. The Committee concluded that the antitrust laws had failed to prevent the formation
of shipping conferences, and that existing legislation was unsuited to correct
conference abuses.13 The Report stated that the conferences preferred a system
of regulation rather than the elimination of the conference system. 34 Although
the system permitted abuses, the Committee concluded that conferences did
benefit the industry generally and should be legalized.35 Accordingly, in several
preliminary attempts to enact a regulatory statute, the Committee presented
proposals to Congress to place the conferences under governmental regulation.
But apparently each of these proposals differed. 6 The bill that finally did pass,
appended to another, more controversial measure, 37 was rushed through under
a rule limiting discussion,' and contained no statement relating to antitrust
further than a recitation of section 15 that approval of an agreement by the
Board would result in exemption.39
31United States v. R.C.A., 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
32 H.R. Doc. No. 805, 63 Cong. 2d Sess. 416 (1914).
33 RepresentativeAlexander, Chairman of the Committee, 53 Cong.Rec. 8,077,8,095 (1916).
There appears to have been strong sentiment in Congress in 1910-12 that shipping conferences
were violative of the antitrust laws. See H.R. Rep.No. 502, 61st Cong. 2d Sess. 4 (1910); see
also, H.R. Rep.No. 2058, 61st Cong. 3d Sess. (1911). H.R. 1010, 62d Cong. 2d Sess. (1912),
provided severe penalties against conferences upon conviction of antitrust violation. The bill
passed the House but was defeated by a Senate filibuster. 48 Cong. Rec. 7,561 (1912).
34 53 Cong. Rec. 8,078 (1916).
- Id., at 8,077.
'6Id., at 8,071.
3"See Frankfurter, J., dissenting, in Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S.
481, 510 (1958); Current Legislation, 17 Col. L. Rev. 354, 357-58 (1917); 53 Cong. Rec.
8,089 (1916).
38 Id., at 8,070-75.

39 Theprovisions of the Federal ship-buying program wererepealed and theplan abandoned
in the 1920 Merchant Marine Act, 41 Stat. 988 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §861 et seq.

(1958).
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However, it is clear that at the time of the Act Congress was concerned with
the diversion of privately owned vessels to the European trade made profitable
by the war. 4 The rapid increase in rates and the likelihood of an American
participation in the war created a sharp demand for an immediate increase in
domestic merchant tonnage. The coupling of the regulatory provisions with the
government ship-purchase program indicates how Congress hoped to achieve
this increase. First, federal money was to buy or lease ships. Second, private
capital was to be encouraged into shipbuilding and shipowning. 41 But the latter
goal could not be accomplished unless shipowners believed that they would be
able to operate at a profit not only during the war but after it as well. Since the
industry had been overtonnaged before the war-accelerated demand, it was
natural to suppose that after the crisis rates would fall. Therefore, it would appear that the purpose of the conferences was at least in part to prevent such a
result. 42 The conferences were to be permitted to set their own rates, subject to
43
approval by the Maritime Board.
Permitting carriers in concert to set the legal tariff was an attempt to
guarantee profitable operations to shipowners. 44 But if conferences were thus
to be encouraged, Congress must have realized that it would be at the expense
of independent carriers. One view of the conference system is that if independent
carriers may operate along the same routes at lower rates, the conference rate
cannot be effectively maintained. 45 Under this view the exemption provision in
the Shipping Act indicates that Congress thought it could best encourage
53 Cong. Rec. 8,079 (1916).
were made in the bill to ensure that government ships would not compete
directly with privately owned vessels. 53 Cong. Rec. 8,079 (1916).
" Congress had previously considered providing direct subsidies to private shipowners. The
idea was rejected, apparently for the reason that it would be incongruous to grant public funds
to operating shipownerswho at thetimewere enjoying exorbitant profits. 53 Cong. Rec. 8,086
(1916). But in 1936 Congress did finally begin subsidizing the industry. 49 Stat. 1995 (1936),
as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §1151 et seq. (1958).
43 The Board could not disapprove rates merely because it thought them unreasonably
high. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F.Supp. 883, 893-94 (S.D.N.Y., 1951), aff'd per curiam sub nom. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Isbrandtsen Co., 342 U.S. 950 (1952),
where judge Frank makes this clear. The Board may disapprove of "unjustly discriminatory"
rates or rates that operate "to the detriment of the commerce of the United States." 39 Stat.
733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §814 (1958). The Board has not sought to control high
rates through interpretive extension of its ambiguous statutory mandate. See Edwards, Maintaining Competition 5 (1949).
44
"[We have no merchant marine and all our products shipped by sea are carried by German, English, and French bottoms. I want to see the American flag float over our shipping as
it did, 50,60, 70 years ago. It will never come by private enterprise, because there is not enough
profit in it to encourage private enterprise."Representative Miller, 53 Cong. Rec. 8,071 (1916).
4s This is the unanimous contention of spokesmen for conference carriers. Numerous statements to this effect are to be found in the Report of the Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, note 32 supra; Hearings Before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, on H.R. 12751, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. (1958). This is also substantially the view of the
Maritime Board. Id., at 241-50.
40

41 Provisions
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shipping by encouraging conference members to expand. But a small conference if given unlimited legal protection could thwart the entrance of any vessel
into a profitable trade, and in this manner destroy the objective of increasing
investment in shipping by independent shipowners. The solution, a compromise
apparently favoring the conferences, was a provision in the Shipping Act requiring the admission of a qualified independent upon proper application.46
In light of the admission provision, it is questionable whether the policy of
the antitrust laws can be said to apply, even where there has been no compliance with the requirements of exemption. Conference agreements may be said
to be as much designed to force the independent to join the combination as to
eliminate him from the trade. 47 Hence, there could be no predatory conference
agreements aimed at independents.
It would appear that Congress attained both its goals in the compulsory
admission provision: the greatest number of ships were encouraged, and the conference system was preserved. This implies that Isbrandtsen was erroneously
decided; that the Shipping Act was intended to condone conference agreements
aimed at independents; and that in the absence of express Board approval,
resort should not be had to the antitrust laws to defeat congressional objectives.
This analysis of congressional intent, however, seems to conflict with the
conclusion suggested by the knowledge that Congress intended the Maritime
Board to operate in the same manner as the ICC.4s The exemption clause of the
Shipping Act did not exist in the Commerce Act; moreover, the Commerce Act
did have a clause expressly reserving common-law and other statutory remedies
which was lacking in the Shipping Act. Perhaps the answer is that the Shipping
Act was designed to conform to the Commerce Act as interpreted by the courts
rather than as written. 49 The exemption provision, for example, was probably a
legislative means of incorporating the rule of reason adopted by the Supreme
Court in the Standard Oil case.50 The drafters of the Shipping Act no doubt
4641 Stat. 996 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §813 (1958).
47 It is of course necessary to keep in mind the broad scope of conference agreements. These

frequently regulate all phases of a member's activity. Were such agreements merely rate arrangements as was urged both by Cunard and by the government in the Far East case, one
could perhaps distinguish between price fixing agreements and predatory tactics. But section
15 of the Shipping Act apparently makes lawful all the provisions of such agreements subject
to approval by the Board. See note 43 supra.
48 53 Cong. Rec. 8,081-82, 8,095-96 (1916).
41E.g., "The provisions of section 27 relating to the power of the board to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary and other evidence are also substantially similar to those of the interstate-commerce act, except that the board may exercise
such power only 'for the purposes of investigating alleged violations of this act' instead of 'for
the purposes of this act' as in the interstate-commerce act. Under this broad phrase in the
latter act as construed by the Supreme Court (Harriman v. United States, 211 U.S. 407 [19081),
the power of the board is limited to investigations of violations." Representative Alexander,
Chairman of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries that drafted the bill. 53 Cong.
Rec. 8,081 (1916).
1,Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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wished to leave to an administrative agency, rather than to the courts, the job
of sifting through the data which would indicate the reasonableness of any
agreement.51 But it may be doubted whether they intended to grant exemption
to an agreement which then would plainly not have been regarded as reasonable
by the courts. 5 2 Thus, ten years after the Shipping Act was enacted, in a suit

53
against a conference involving technical matters of the shipping industry,
where the challenged practice was patently unreasonable, no mention was made
54
by the Supreme Court of any exemption that the Shipping Act could provide.
After Cisnard, however, courts began referring matters to the agency no
matter how extreme the allegations. 5 A notable exception was the case of Slick
Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines," where a claim of possible exemption under
an exemption provision in the Civil Aeronautics Act 57 similar to the provision in
the Shipping Act was made by the defendant airline in defense of a treble
damage action. District judge Forman emphatically rejected "the suggestion

51Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 310 n.13 (1949).
52 "There is no similar provision in the Interstate Commerce Act. Its inclusion in the present
statute, therefore, seems to give legislative sanction to the recent tendency of the courts to
permit reasonable restraints on free competition, in the interest of greater efficiency in the
management of important industries." Current Legislation, 17 Col. L. Rev. 354,358-59 (1917),
cited, apparently for this observation, in United States v. American Union Transport, 327
U.S. 437,447 n.8, (1946).
Even in Standard Oil the Court, while rejecting the Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic rejection of the rule of reason, also concluded that the type of arrangement in those cases-price
fixing-was inherently unreasonable. 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911). In Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S.
66, 84-86 (1917), decided after the Shipping Act became law, the Court declared that conference activities had been inherently unreasonable before the Act. It was the opinion of the
British Royal Commission on Shipping Rings reporting on thelegality of conferences that such
arrangements were illegal under the Sherman Act. The Law as to Combinations, 10 J.
Soc. of Comp. Leg. 144, 175 (1909). The same view was expressed in Attorney General v.
Adelaide S.S. Co., [1913] A.C. 781.
63 Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359 (1926). A unanimous court opinion in both
this case and Cunard was written by Justice Sutherland.
11In Buyer v. Guillan, 271 Fed. 65 (C.A.2d, 1921), an injunction was granted against a
conference without mention of the primary jurisdiction of the Maritime Board. In Burgess
Bros. Co. v. Stewart, 114 Misc. 673, 187 N.Y.S. 873 (S.Ct., 1921), an injunction against a
conference was granted for violation of the New York Criminal Code and for violation of
sections of the Shipping Act. Here as well, no question of the primary jurisdiction of the Maritime Board was discussed. See also, Copper River Packing Co. v. Alaska S.S. Co., 22 F.2d 12
(C.A.9th, 1927); European Commercial Co. v. International Mercantile Marine Co.,
[1923] A.M.C. 211 (S.D.N.Y., 1923). Since courts may hold that referral to the Board is
necessary without such claim being made by either party, these cases indicate that until
Cunard no court construed the Shipping Act either as completely exempting shipping from the
antitrust laws, or as necessitating primary jurisdiction. Compare the use made by the Supreme Court of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction in United States Alkali Ass'n
v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 208 (1945).
See cases cited notes 2, 14, 22 supra.
56107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J., 1952), appeal dismissed sub nom. American .Airlines, Inc. v.
Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (C.A.3d, 1953), cert. denied 346 U.S. 806 (1953).
752 Stat. 1004 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. §494 (1952).
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that a conspiracy to drive a competitor out of business ...is the type of agreement encompassed within the statute and subject to the primary jurisdiction
of the CAB for approval or disapproval and for possible immunity from the
antitrust laws."" s It seemed plain to him that the exemption provision in a
regulatory act applied only to those agreements "which axe contracts openly
arrived at rather than secret conspiracies." More specifically, Congress intended
to permit the regulated firms to get together to fix rates and establish industrywide uniformity of standards and conditions. These activities Congress considered normal business functions desirable for the efficient organization of the
industry. But were it not for the immunity provision, such activities would be
technical violations of the antitrust laws. Judge Forman believed that immunity
extends only to these open agreements in contradistinction to a "secretive and
furtive" conspiracy to restrain trade. Unfiled predatory agreements are in the
latter class.
The Forman view finds some support in the Act. The exclusion of tramps,69
which differ from other liners principally in the regularity of service they provide," indicates that the Act was concerned with immunizing such open and
normal business agreements as those which dealt with the regularity of service.
The Forman view is, however, a minority position.6 No doubt the hesitancy of
other courts in adopting this view can be attributed to the fact that prior to the
Isbrandtsen case there had been no explicit limitation set upon the authority of
the Board to approve.62 Henceforth the Shipping Board may not approve
agreements aimed at non-members. If such agreements cannot be approved,
then by definition they are not within normal business needs. Conversely,
agreements limiting competition between conference members may be approved. Since what may be classified as business needs concerns the activities of
members to the agreement and would not normally consist of agreements
68 Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, 107 F.Supp. 199, 207 (D.N.J., 1952).
59 40 Stat. 900 (1918), as ammended, 46 U.S.C.A. §801 (1952). See Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. The S.S. Anghyra, 157 F.Supp. 737, 752 (E.D.Va., 1957).
60There are other varying characteristics. Tramp vessels generally carry bulk cargo. Usually, they carry less than three types of goods on any single trip. While tramps only compete for
the general merchandise freight of liners in periods of cargo shortage, liners are always ready
to carry bulk cargo at liner rates. See generally, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Maritime Affairs of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H.R. 6719, 85th Cong.
2d Sess. (1950).
611n varying degrees, other courts have approached this position. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Aircoach Transport
Ass'n, 253 F.2d 877 (App.D.C., 1958); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated
Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 184 F.2d 552 (C.A.4th, 1950), supplemental opinion rendered, 186
F.2d 934 (1951), cert. denied 340 U.S. 906 (1951); United States v. Association of American Railroads, 4 F.R.D. 510 (D.Neb., 1945).
2 "But with the broad power of exemption possessed by the Board under the Civil Aeronautics Act, we cannot know the extent of exemption until the Board has acted." Apgar Travel
Agency, Inc. v. International Air Transport Ass'n, 107 F.Supp. 706, 710 (S.D.N.Y., 1952).
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specifically aimed at non-members, it would appear that the Court in Isbrandisenit heading toward Judge Forman's view.
Although the Isbrandtsenpremise that there can be such a thing as a conference agreement which has a function other than the elimination of outside
competition invites some speculation, it appears that its validity can be
demonstrated. Prior to Isbrandtsen,the most effective retaliatory measure employed by the conferences was the dual-rate system. Under this plan a shipper
who utilized the facilities of the independent would be subjected to a higher
rate on those goods which he sent by conference liners; of course he would have
to use conference liners to some extent, and the savings realized by shipping
63
with an independent were cancelled out by the increased conference rate.
Thus, even the bulk shipper, for example, who did not need or want the speed,
service or regularity of the conference liner and who did not want to pay for
them, was forced to ship via conference vessels exclusively because of the operation of the dual-rate system. Isbrandtsen eliminates such predatory agreements,
and allows only normal business agreements. To the argument of the conferences that such an interpretation will undercut conference rates and destroy
the whole conference system it should be replied that for many shippers the
liner service which only the conference can provide is indispensable; as to this
service, the independents are no competition. Thus, the independents and
tramps will only be enabled to compete for that trade which the conferences
have heretofore provided with unnecessary and unwanted services.
II
Although it may not be inconsistent with regulatory policy for antitrust
policy to apply to shipping conferences, it would appear that antitrust could
only apply where there has been no valid Board approval. The defense of primary jurisdiction to an antitrust suit was said by the Court in United States v.
R.C.A.1 4 to be applicable where the defendant belongs to an industry where
there is an all-pervasive scheme of regulation. The plaintiff in Cunardappears to
have argued on the theory that the exemption granted by the Shipping Act was
only in return for a submission by the carriers to a system of regulation. The
defendant conference had not filed the agreement among the members to institute a dual-rate system with the Shipping Board. The plaintiff further insisted
that had the agreement been filed, the Board would not have approved it.65
Failure to submit to the scheme of regulation, it was argued, left an antitrust
remedy open. These contentions were flatly rejected by the Court:
63See Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 306 (1937).
64 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
15It seems more likely that the Board would have approved. A dual-rate agreement had
been disapproved for an intercoastal conferencein Eden Mining v. Bluefield Fruit & Steamship
Co., 1 U.S.S.B. 41 (1922). But a similar agreement was subsequently approved for a conference
of carriers in foreign commerce. Rawleigh v. Stoomvaart, 1 U.S.S.B. 285 (1933).
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[W]hatever may be the form of the agreement, and whether it be lawful or unlawful
upon its face, Congress undoubtedly intended that the board should possess the
authority primarily to hear and adjudge the matter.
While competitors of shipping conferences have been largely unsuccessful
in urging strict compliance with the exemption provision of the Shipping Act,
strict compliance with the exemption provisions of other acts has been required
by the Court in several cases.67 The rationale of these cases was successfully
applied against conferences in two cases" where the conference attempted to
enforce a penalty clause in an unfiled dual-rate contract. The defense to both
actions was that the contracts violated the Shipping Act and the antitrust laws.
The conference urged that the courts refer the question of approval of the conference agreement to the Maritime Board. But the courts refused to permit
retroactive immunization of the agreements.
Not only is there dicta to the effect that failure to file will leave the antitrust
remedy open,69 but the district court so held in United States v. Far East Conference.7 1 As in Cunard, the conference had failed to file dual-rate agreements.
The court reasoned that the exemption granted by section 15 of the Shipping
Act might be interposed as a substantive defense but could not be raised as a
procedural bar to the right of the United States to prosecute the antitrust
action. Since no approval by the Board had been sought, the conference had no
defense to the action.7 ' The district court distinguished Cunard as a private
66 United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 487 (1932). "[A] failure
to file such an agreement with the Board will not afford ground for an injunction under §16 of
the Clayton Act at the suit of private parties.., since the maintenance of such a suit, being
predicated upon a violation of the antitrust laws, depends upon the right to seek a remedy
under those laws, a right which, as we have seen, does not here exist." Id., at 486.
17 United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939); United States Alkali Ass'n v. United
States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945); American Cooperative Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co. 153
F.2d 907 (C.A.7th, 1946), cert. denied 329 U.S. 721 (1946).
8 River Plate and Brazil Conferences v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 227 F.2d 60 (C.A.2d, 1955);
Pacific Westbound Conference v. Leval & Co., 201 Ore. 390, 269 P.2d 541 (1954), cert. denied
348 U.S. 897 (1954).
61United States v. American Union Transp., 327 U.S. 437, 447 n.8 (1945); Isbrandtsen
Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 57 (App.D.C., 1954), cert. denied 347 U.S. 990 (1954);
Atlantic and Gulf West Coast Conference v. United States, 94 F.Supp. 138, 141 (S.D.N.Y.,
1950).
70 94 F.Supp. 900 (D.N.J., 1951).
71The same rationale in an antitrust shipping case is only to be found in an early district
court opinion written by judge Augustus Hand. In European Commercial Co., v. International
Mercantile Marine Co., [1923] A.M.C. 211 (S.D.N.Y., 1923), the unfied agreement was to fix
prices and to exclude steamship ticket agents not agreeable to the conference from selling
tickets for the Mediterranean trade. The conference urged upon the court that the antitrust
laws were inapplicable to it. "[Tlhe trade agreements most [sic] have been filed if it [sic] is to
be relied on as bringing the case within the exception from the operation of the Sherman AntiTrust Act.... It also must have been approved by the Shipping Board if made subsequent to
the organization thereof. To bring the case within the exception would seem to be a matter of
defense." Id., at 215. The plaintiff was allowed both injunctive relief and damages. (Strange-
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action and not a government suit. On appeal 7 2however, the Supreme Court saw
It chose to reaffirm Cunard. The government
no reason for such a distinction.
73
was referred to the Board.

That failure to file as required by section 15 should thereby allow the antitrust suit was rejected by Cunard and FarEast on the ground that the Board
was authorized to afford relief for that violation. Section 31 specifies a fine of
$5,000 for violations of the Act except where other penalties are provided for
violations of specific subsections. The remedy for a violation of section 15 appears at the end of that subsection: 4 "Whoever violates any provision of this
section shall be liable to a penalty of $1,000 for each day such violation continues, to be recovered by the United States in a civil action." Thus the failure
to file would appear to be exclusively remediable before the court and not the
Board. The government antitrust suit, as in Far East, has as its purpose the
same end as this provision: that the conference either file the agreement and
submit to regulation, or cease the activity.76 But if this is correct, then it would
appear inconsistent to require the government to proceed to its objective under
76
the Shipping Act before a court, and under the antitrust laws before the Board.
ly, this opinion was not reported by any of the standard reporters of the day. Even in the first
volume of the American Maritime Cases it is not to be found in the index. As far as appears the
case has never been cited, even by plaintiffs.)
- 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
73 The Far East holding was immediately extended to cover criminal suits brought by the
government against conferences. United States v. Alaska Steamship Co., 110 F.Supp. 104
(W.D.Wash., 1952).
74 39 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §814 (1958).
7
6,"[Wlhile, because of necessity in connection with the maintenance of adequate sea
transportation for this country, Congress felt that the steamship companies could combine and
operate to some extent in restraint of trade and carry on a monopolistic practice, for the protection of the public interest this was to be permitted only under due and proper supervision."
Pacific Westbound Conference v. Leval & Co., 201 Ore. 390,393, 269 P.2d 541,543 (1954), cert.
denied 348 U.S. 897 (1954).
As long as the conference does not file a dual-rate system, the members may apply the system with arbitrary severity. The higher rate may have been filled prior to the agreement to
initiate dual-rates. Or, the members may file the higher rate as a new rate to displace a former
tariff, after the agreement. But no rate lower than the filed rate may legally be changed. Thus,
shippers signing the conference dual-rate form enter into agreements which the conference
may enforce for any suspected breach. But neither the Maritime Board nor any court will sustain the claim of a shipper for the lower contract rate. Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. S. H.
Kress & Co., 284 N.Y.S. 310, 157 Misc. 360 (S.Ct., 1935).
76Which typeof proceeding the government chooses to bring may be important to the independent. Under section 5 of the Clayton Act, a government antitrust decree serves as prima
facie evidence in a subsequent private suit against the same defendant. But a government
proceeding under any provision of the Shipping Act does not benefit future plaintiffs. Cf.
Proper v. John Bene & Sons, 295 Fed. 729 (E.D.N.Y., 1923). Section 5 is part of a legislative
policy of minimizing the burden of litigation for injured private suitors and complementing
the government in enforcing the antitrust laws. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
340 U.S. 558 (1951).
There is also a practical difference in the deterrent effect of the antitrust and Shipping Act
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Although the Shipping Act makes non-filing of an agreement unlawful, and
provides a penalty for its violation, the conferences are able safely to assume
the risks of non-filing through the application, or frequently the misapplication,
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. When the conference receives notice of a
forthcoming antitrust suit, there is ample opportunity to seek the shelter of
exemption by filing and having approved all agreements which tend to prove
the conspiracy. But to file with the Board is to assume the risk of disapproval
before the antitrust suit.
By not filing, two defenses remain open to the antitrust suit. First, the conference denies any combination to eliminate the independent. Second, and in
spite of the first defense, the conference insists that if there is an agreement the
proper forum is the Maritime Board, as the combination might be lawful and
the Board should be allowed to exempt it from antitrust liability. When the
court dismisses in deference to the Board, the conference still need not file the
agreement as it may continue to maintain that there is no conspiracy, and hence
nothing to file with the Board. The burden then remains with the plaintiff to
initiate proceedings with the Board. Before the Board, the charge of conspiracy
may be denied. Plaintiff will then be forced to prove all that he would have had
to prove in the antitrust suit. If the plaintiff is successful before the Board in
showing an unfiled agreement, the conference may still hope that the agreement
will then be approved by the Board. If the agreement is approved, the conduct
of the parties to the agreement is immunized retroactively. Once approved, it is
hardly likely that the Board will suggest to the Department of Justice that it
proceed against the conference to collect the fine for failure to file. Even if the
Board disapproves, any recommendation to the Department of Justice will
probably not result in action.
Disapproval will usually cause the discontinuance of the particular practice.
Since the purpose of the government suit is to force filing or discontinuance of
the activity, that purpose would have already been achieved by the disapproval.
Moreover, the conference assumes a minimal risk of injury should the agreement be disapproved. The Board may order that the conference cease and desist
from the discrimination, and to that extent the conference may be injured. 77
But there is little precedent for the Board to apply any of the fines in the Shippenalties. In point of fact, a suit to collect the section 15 per day fine appears never to have
been brought by the government. Other sections of the Shipping Act provide for penalties up
to $25,000 for each violation. These may be assessed against the offending carrier. It would
seem that the $50,000 antitrust penalty, imposed on directors individually and not deductible
as a business expense, would prove a greater deterrent.
7 "The equity suit is simply an injunction to go ahead and sin no more, and that works
pretty well much as it did work in the Methodist community in which I grew up; a man became good for a few weeks but after a year he was the same old reprobate as he was at the
beginning of that period." Testimony of Walton Hamilton, Hearings, Subcommittee on the
Study of Monopoly Power of the House Judici~l Conmittee, on H.R. 7905, 81st Cong. 2d
Sess, Part V, p. 57 (1949).
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ping Act. Because the injured independent may not claim treble damages in an
original court action, the most the conference has to fear from the litigious independent is a Board award under the reparations provision of the Shipping Act.
However, Board policy and interpretation do not favor the claim of the independent.7 9 The nature of the reparations provision is also incommodious to his
claim."0 Both considerations augur at best a meager award by antitrust standards. Even after the award the independent must further pursue his claim
through a jury trial enforcement proceeding in which the Board's award will
serve only as prima facie evidence,8 ' rebuttable by new evidence.82
It may be that several policy factors relating to the requirements of filing and
approval were crucial to the Court in deciding in Cunard and Far East to disassociate non-filing from antitrust. The Shipping Act at its date of enactment
required that all presently existing conferences submit to the Board a written
copy of the basic conference agreement pursuant to which the conferences
operated.8 3 The agreements that were submitted were broadly phrased. They
78See note 76 supra. In American Union Transp., Inc. v. River Plate and Brazil Conferences, 5 F.M.B. 216 (1957), the plaintiff strongly urged that in accordance with the examiner's
suggestion the Board recommend that the Attorney General pursue the penalty of $1,000
per day for failure by the defendant conference to file the challenged agreement. The Board
admitted that there was a "want of clarity in prior Board decisions pertaining to... the
requirement of filing of agreements under §15." Quoted from the decision of the Court of
Appeals, 257 F.2d 607, 611 (App.D.C., 1958). It would therefore not take any action aimed
at the collection of the penalty. But sometime in the future it intended to initiate a rulemaking proceeding that would result in "a more definitive guide."
71American Union Transp., Inc. v. River Plate and Brazil Conferences, 126 F.Supp. 91
(S.D.N.Y., 1954), aff'd 222 F.2d 369 (C.A.2d, 1955). The plaintiff then took its complaint to
the Maritime Board. On review of the Board decision, 257 F.2d 607 (App.D.C., 1958), the
Court of Appeals agreed that section 15 had been violated, and that it was the purpose of the
conference to punish the independent. Id., at 613 n.6. However, it chose "not [to]
pit its view
against that of the Board." Id., at 612. To make its decision more palatable the court gave
extended attention to the Board's alternative grounds which distinguished between the services
of a "broker" and a "freight-forwarder." The Supreme Court denied certiorari five months
after handing down Isbrandtsen. 358 U.S. 828 (1958).
80 See text at notes 97, 109-11 infra.
8139 Stat. 737 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §829 (1958).
82In Roberto Hernandez, Inc. v. Arnold Bernstein S., M.B.H., 31 F.Supp. 76 (S.D.N.Y.,
1940), the plaintiff attempted to enforce a Board award of $25,000 against a conference for unjust discrimination. The district court retried the issue and found for the conference on the
ground that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate damages, and that the basis for assessing
proper damages was speculative. The decision was reversed on appeal. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the plaintiff really didn't have an opportunity to mitigate damages. 116 F.2d
849 (C.A.2d, 1941), cert. denied 313 U.S. 582 (1941). See also, Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.,
236 U.S. 412, 430 (1915); Campagnie Generale Transatlantique v. American Tobacco Co., 31
F.2d 663, 665 (C.A.2d, 1929).
At the enforcement trial, the sum awarded by the Board may be reduced in favor of the
defendant. But the court may not increase the sum in favor of the plaintiff. Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co. v. Brady, 288 U.S. 448 (1933).
83 But it was eleven years after the passage of the Act that the Board first promulgated a
rule mildly admonishing the conferences to file their agreements. 46 C.F.R. §222.15 (Sept. 1,
1927). However, the following year Congress inaugurated its policy of subsidizing American

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

outlined the purposes and activities of the conferences. In all these agreements
there were provisions whereby the conference declared a purpose to set rates.
The Maritime Board early adopted a "cover of authority" policy whereby the
basic conference agreement was held to permit subsequent rate changes without
8 4
further Board approval
While this policy of the Board was in effect, it would seem that a conference
may have in good faith relied on the inaction of the Board with respect to the
agency's requirements as to which types of agreements should be filed.85 Thus,
in an antitrust suit against a conference there was the possibility that the independent was invoking sanctions against a conference agreement perhaps entitled to approval and exemption. To find a per se price fixing violation in such
an agreement would not have appeared equitable under the circumstances. Instead, Cunard permitted the conference to justify the agreement before the
Board, irrespective of the fact of previous failure to file.
However, two years after FarEast the "cover of authority" procedure of the
Board was expresslyrejected by the Court of Appeals for theDistrict of Columbia
in Isbrandtsen Co. v. UnitedStates."8 An independent challenged the power of the
Board to allow a dual-rate system filed by the conference to go into effect prior
to a hearing and formal approval by the Board. The court rejected the Board's
contention that the basic conference agreement carried with it the "cover of
authority" for subsequent changes. That argument, the court declared, would
be inconsistent with the section 15 requirement that agreements or modifications "shall be lawful only when and as long as approved" by the Board. In accordance with this opinion, the Board has radically altered its policy.. The
"cover of authority" policy has been abandoned. The Board now strictly adheres to the requirement that every agreement and modification be filed for approval.87 Thus, it would appear unlikely that a conference agreement remains
unfiled with the Board because of the negligence of the parties, or in reliance on
flag carriers. The subsidy program was placed in the administrative control of the Board. It
is reliably reported that the Board was "so busy with the problem of subsidy allocation that
regulation was not very effective." Koontz, Government Control of Business 229 (1941). To
the same effect is a statement by a Shipping Board official, Zeis, American Shipping Policy 168
(1938).
84
Prior to 1954, "approval" by the Board normally consisted only of routine inspection of
agreements and supporting information without a hearing, if the agreements were filed at all.
See Ex parte 4, Section 15 Inquiry, 1 U.S.S.B. 121, 124 (1927). Where there was a basic conference agreement, there was no effort by the Board to demand that records of the changes be
filed for approval. See also, Marx, International Shipping Cartels 210 (1953).
Few dual-rate agreements were apparently on file. The Board did not urge the filing of
such agreements until General Order 76,46 C.F.R. §236 (1958). "The purpose of theproposed
rule is to obtain information with respect to the operation of contract/non-contract rate
systems... ." 17 F.R. 7020 (1952).
86211 F.2d 51 (App.D.C., 1954), cert. denied 347 U.S. 990 (1954).
87E.g., Conference Limitation on Membership Case, [1957] A.M.C. 1599, 1623.
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the inactivity of the Board. Unfiled agreements henceforth strongly suggest that
the parties to the agreement fear disapproval by the Board. Particularly would
this appear to be so after Federal Maritime Board v. IsbrandsenCo. 88
It is now generally known which agreements can be approved and which can
not. The opinions in Cunardand FarEast contained no hint that the Board could
not approve predatory agreements. Indeed, the Maritime Board had itself intervened in a suit on behalf of a conference and argued a construction of the Act
that justified the approval of agreements that "obliterate" the competition of
independents.89 But now that a conference can predict with a degree of certainty whether an agreement will be approved, failure to file must indicate that
the conference preferred silence to an admission because the purpose of the
agreement was unlawful. Moreover, the element of certainty in the approval
functions of the Board alter two other considerations for referring to the Board.
Judge Hand in the Cunard case before the Court of Appeals" voiced the fear
that should the court issue an injunction under the antitrust laws, the process
of the court might be wasteful should the Board subsequently approve the
agreement in question. Turned the other way, it is seen that a strong reason for
referral to the Board was the hesitancy of a court to declare an agreement unlawful under antitrust principles when the agreement might be lawful under the
regulatory act and, if thus lawful, exempt the parties to it from all liability.
But if an agreement is patently predatory, as for example the same dual-rate
agreement declared unlawful in Isbrandtsen, then the court need not fear wasting its process. Even if the court is not convinced that the Board would disapprove, it may serve a valuable function in allowing a temporary injunction.
The Maritime Board can not provide such relief, but can only issue orders after
a full hearing.9 Further, should the court decide the antitrust charge on its
merits and enjoin certain practices, it is questionable whether subsequent Board
approval would automatically dissolve the court order. It would appear that on
principles of res judicata a defendant successful before the Board would have to
amend the court order before he could resume activities pursuant to Board approval. 2 This may have been an undesirable procedure where the policies of the
Board were at variance with those of antitrust. The Board, it was thought,
could approve any agreement it considered in the maritime interests of the
United States. Under this broad criterion the Board apparently could approve
agreements "destroying competition." 93 Thus, deference to primary Board con88 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
89
1Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F.Supp. 883, 893-94 (S.D.N.Y., 1951), aff'd per
curiam sub nora. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Isbrandtsen Co., 342 U.S. 950 (1952).
9050 F.2d 83 (C.A.2d, 1931).
9139 Stat. 736 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §822 (1952).
9See Judicial Application of Antitrust Law to Regulated Industries, 64 Harv. L. Rev.
1154, 1166 (1951), and cases there cited.
9339 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §814 (1958).
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sideration was a means of harmonizing the variant policies of the two acts. But
to the extent that henceforth the Board may not approve predatory agreements
even if they further other regulatory policies, Isbrandtsenhas declared a rule for
the Board in harmony with the policies of the antitrust laws. However, if there
will thus occur no clash in policies, then the purpose of harmonizing the two
statutes through what Cunard described as supersession of the antitrust laws
would appear no longer necessary.
Isbrandtsen has declared that courts which have construed Cunard and Far
East as saying that the Board could properly approve predatory conference
agreements have misread those cases. It may thus be probable that too many
inferences have been drawn from those cases. The belief by some courts that
these cases along with Terminal establish that a complainant referred to the
Board on primary jurisdiction must exhaust his administrative remedies before
resuming his antitrust action, may be unfounded. In Cunard, the independent
asked that the rate system be enjoined. In FarEast the government also asked
for an injunction. In neither case was there a request for temporary relief. An
order by the Board could adequately have accomplished the purpose. Moreover, since it then appeared that the Board could well approve the agreements,
there was at least a suspicion that the plaintiffs were purposely avoiding the
Board for fear of a negative result rather than relying on the antitrust laws to
vindicate a right not assertable otherwise.
. The question of exhaustion arises in its most pressing form when
the plainv.
Pennsylvania
R. Co.94
Terminal
Warehouse
Co.
tiff seeks treble damages.
in its discussion of the Shipping Act, and Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.
Co.95 are the cases generally relied upon for the proposition that upon primary jurisdiction being applied the plaintiff must attempt to seek damages
under the reparations provision of the regulatory act.96 From these cases
the further addition to the doctrine is made that damages by way of reparations are an adequate substitute for the antitrust treble damages. However, it would appear crucial that in Terminal and Keogh the plaintiff seeking treble damages was not an independent competitor but a shipper. In both
cases the plaintiff had first sought relief before the ICC. After being refused
damages by the Commission, the shipper brought a treble damage action against
the carriers. The violation alleged was a conspiracy to charge higher rates to the
injury of the shipper. The Circuit Court in Terminal held that the shipper was
barred from the antitrust damage remedy if the Commission had rejected his
claim. The Supreme Court went on to say that the Commerce Act had made
unavailable the antitrust remedy.
It would appear that the statement by the Court in Terminalwas peculiarly
94297 U.S. 500 (1936).
96260 U.S. 156 (1922).
98See cases cited in note 20 supra.
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fitting for the facts of the case. First, it appeared that the shipper was trying to
get by indirection through antitrust what he could not get by way of the Commission. 7 The complaint technically charged a violation of the antitrust laws.
But the identical issue of discriminatory rates had already been adjudicated in
an adversary proceeding before the Commission. Second, even had there been
no prior proceedings before the Commission, the agency and not the court appeared to be the more appropriate forum, because: (1) The Commission idea
was originally conceived as a convenient and inexpensive forum for shippers who
could proceed against the carriers without the funds necessary to maintain an
elaborate trial; (2) The Commission was authorized to award reparations. This
form of money award was regarded as adequate relief for rates charged above
the legal tariff. It is in fact a remedy for breach of contract or quasi-contractual
obligation to charge reasonable rates;" (3) Courts prefer to leave questions of
rate overcharges to the agencies because of the general policy of the regulatory
acts for uniform treatment of shippers. If the court should award treble damages to one shipper, that alert suitor would gain an advantage over competing
shippers who were not parties to the suit;9 9 (4) To adjudicate an alleged overcharge would involve the court in considerations as to what a reasonable rate
should have been. Railroad rate determination had been designated by Congress as an exclusive administrative function.
Thus, it may accurately be said that Terminal only established the requirement of exhaustion of remedies when primary jurisdiction applied to shippers.
Indeed, there appears to be good reason for a distinction in this rule between
shippers and independent competitors.
The independent appears to have particular reason for seeking the antitrust
remedy rather than proceeding under the Shipping Act. The independent may
feel that both the Board's cease and desist order and its power to grant reparations are not adequate substitutes for the antitrust remedies. The Board cannot issue injunctions as such. 10 It has disclaimed power to enjoin threatened
97 In American Union Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 159 Fed. 278 (E.D.Pa., 1908), the
court held that a complaint for alleged overcharges charged a violation of the Interstate Commerce Act and not the Sherman Act. It would not permit a shipper to dress up an alleged
violation of the Commerce Act in antitrust language in an effort to collect treble damages. The
antitrust portion of the complaint was accordingly dismissed.
"Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 970 (C.A.7th, 1943);
Hawaiian Airlines v. Trans-Pacific Airlines, 78 F.Supp. 1, 4-5 (D.Hawaii, 1948).
11Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922). But the criterion of uniformity has no application in an antitrust suit by an independent competitor. Story Parchment v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
Parity among shippers also involves industry-wide considerations. Exaction of the legal
rate which is alleged to be excessive involves considerations as to the ability of the shipper
relative to his competitors to pass on the rate differential to his customers.
100 United States v. Far East Conference, 94 F.Supp. 900 (D.N.J., 1951), rev'd on other
grounds 342 U.S. 570 (1952); New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co. v. United States, 32 F.Supp. 538
(S.D.N.Y., 1940), rev'd on rehearing on other grounds 36 F.Supp. 190 (E.D.N.Y., 1940). Note
the statutory provision in 39 Stat. 737 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §828 (1958).
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violations of the Act. 01 It will provide relief only for actual violations.0 2 Orders
of the Board must be enforced by a district court having jurisdiction over the
defendant carriers. Further, the Board can neither grant temporary relief, nor
modify its own previous orders prior to a full hearing.' Between the filing of a
complaint and the time for hearing several years may elapse. 10 4 Thus, if an independent is not to be driven out of the trade by a conspiracy against him, he
must seek the aid of the district court in the first instance to obtain temporary
injunctive relief' 5 by showing irreparable injury.0 6 Here he must produce much
07
of the same evidence he would ordinarily present in a regular antitrust suit.
The temporary injunction may of course be appealed by the conference, so that
the independent may have to litigate through the courts while his petition is
pending before the Board.
If the independent must proceed before the Board and present all his evidence of a conspiracy against him, he does not have the advantages of the liberal
discovery procedures that he may employ under the antitrust laws.0 8 Since he
must prove before the Board much the same charges as he would have to in the
antitrust suit, lack of discovery procedure may constitute a serious disadvantage. 109 He also loses the jury trial to which he otherwise would be entitled.
101 Chicago, Benton Harbor & South Haven Transit Co. v. Goodrich Transit Co., Complaint Docket 40, June 23, 1927, discussed in Wisconsin & Michigan Transp. Co. v. Pere
Marquette L.S., 67 F.2d 937 (C.A.7th, 1933). Note also the provisions of 39 Stat. 736
(1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §821 (1958).
10239 Stat. 736 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §821 (1958). See note 49 supra.
103 See United States Trucking Corp. v. American Export Lines, 146 F.Supp. 924

(S.D.N.Y., 1956).
104 SeeRivoli Trucking Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 167 F.Supp. 943,945 (S.D.N.Y.,

1957); Riss & Co. v. Association of American Railroads, 170 F.Supp. 354, 368-69 (D.D.C.,
1959).
"0 In West India Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 170 F.2d 775 (C.A.2d, 1948), the
court sustained an injunction granted with the Board's approval on the theory that the Board
lacked power to grant relief pending its determination on a formal complaint. See Isbrandtsen
Co. v. United States, 81 F.Supp. 544, 547 (S.D.N.Y., 1948), aff'd per curiam sub nom. A/S J.
Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Isbrandtsen Co., 336 U.S. 941 (1949); Jewett Bros. & Jewett v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 156 Fed. 160, 167 (C.C.S.D., 1907).
06 See United States v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd., 141 F.Supp. 396 (N.D.Cal., 1955). "The
size and scope of the conspiracy alleged would make necessary a lengthy and costly hearing
[on the prayer for interim relief]. Preparation for this would involve the same kind of detailed
discovery that is now going on in preparation for the trial itself." Riss & Co. v. Association of
American Railroads, 170 F.Supp. 354, 368 (D.D.C., 1959).
107 Although the Board is empowered to implement the regulatory provisions of the Shipping Act, it may look to evidence concerning any aspect of the shipping industry in judging a
complaint. It is not restricted to evidence of specific practices among particular conference
members. Atlantic & Gulf/West Coast Conference v. United States, 94 F.Supp. 138 (S.D
N.Y., 1950).
108 See Riss & Co. v. Association of American Railroads, 170 F.Supp. 354, 369 (D.D.C.,
1959).
119 A plaintiff in an antitrust treble damage action may demand a jury trial. Fleitman v.
Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916); Blechman v. Kleinert Rubber Co., 98
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Moreover, the treble damages contemplated by the antitrust laws are not
usually for charges over the legal tariff. The independent is not claiming breach
of contract damages, but rather damages which are partly tort and partly
penal. n 0 The independent frequently asserts that it has sustained injuries which
are measurable in terms of damage to the good will, to business, the property,
the competitive position and the future prospects of the independent carrier in
the trade."' Such damages the Board cannot award" Indeed, there may be no
damages awarded as reparations to an independent where under antitrust very
sizeable damages would be awarded. Further, even where reparations may be
available in part, the independent must contend with two short statutes of
limitations. He has two years within which to file a complaint before the Board.
If he is successful in his claim, he must enforce the money award within one
year by re-trying the Board award in a court of law before a jury. Thus, where
primary jurisdiction is applied and the court dismisses, the limitations provision of the Shipping Act may well have run. If the independent loses in his
reparations claim before the Board, he is foreclosed from initiating an antitrust
charge on the same or related facts."3 If he succeeds before the Board it would
4
appear that he is barred from antitrust damages under an election theory."
F.Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y., 1951). Section 22 of the Shipping Act only provides for a jury trial
in the enforcement proceedings at the defendant's choice.
In theory, the plaintiff may be said to retain the privilege of an antitrust jury trial after
the Board proceedings. But since there is also the requirement of exhaustion once the plaintiff
is before the Board, in practical effect the administrative proceedings are dispositive of the
claim. Cases such as S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n of America, 191 F.2d 658 (App.D.C.,
1951), cert. denied 343 U.S. 955 (1953), which outline a two-step procedure, are confined to
agencies powerless to award reparations, such as the CAB and the FPC.
110
Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 970 (C.A.7th, 1943);
Story Parchment v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931). See note 97 supra.
M Cf. Story Parchment v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
1
See Slick Airway, Inc. v. American Airlines, 107 F.Supp. 199 (D.N.J., 1952), aff'd on
rehearing, 107 F.Supp. 214,216,218, appeal dismissed sub nom. American Airlines v. Forman,
204 F.2d 230 (C.A.3d, 1953), cert. denied 346 U.S. 806 (1953) (reparations provision of the
Civil Aeronautics Act); Hawaiian Airlines v. Trans-Pacific Airlines, 78 F.Supp. 1, 4-5, 8
(D.Rawaii, 1948) (reparations provision of Shipping Act); Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.,
183 Fed. 548, 551 (C.A.2d, 1910) (reparations provisions of Commerce Act); Jewett Bros. &
Jewett v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 156 Fed. 160, 167 (C.C.S.D., 1907) (same); McClellan v. Montana-Dakota Utilities, 95 F.Supp. 977 (D.Minn., 1951). These cases are a
minority. But the reparations provision of the Shipping Act has been strictly construed. Prince
Line v. American Paper Exports, 55 F.2d 1053 (C.A.2d, 1932).
113
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Terminal Warehouse Co., 78 F.2d 591 (C.A.3d, 1935), aff'd
297 U.S. 500 (1936).
"4Ifthe complaint of theindependent is limited to the charge that a conference is operating
under an unapproved agreement, or an agreement broader than one actually approved, judicial
review of an adverse decision by the Board may not lie. In Associated-Banning Co. v. United
States, 247 F.2d 557 (App.D.C., 1957), the question of standing to appeal a Board decision on
such a question was raised. The court decided the case on other grounds but in dictum indicated its answer to this question: "That §15 authorizes theBoard to act in thepublic interest is
clear; not so, that its action, once taken, is subject to review at the instance of those asserting
private rights." Id., at 561 n.9. Cf. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940).
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It may be suggested that after proceeding before the Board the independent
should be allowed to waive any claim to reparations and resume or begin a
treble damage action. Or, in the alternative, that after any reparation award,
the independent should collect the additional difference between treble damages
and reparations. In the first situation, were it possible, the independent would
risk losing any reparations he may be entitled to for the sake of antitrust. If
unsuccessful in the antitrust action he would most likely be unable to return
to the reparations remedy because of the short limitations. In both cases the
conference might delay the proceedings before the Board and before the court
of enforcement until the antitrust statute of limitation on the injury had run.
Even the threat of such delay is a potent weapon." 5
The distinction between an antitrust claim made by an independent and one
made by a shipper was read into the Shipping Act by the Court in Isbrandtsen.
The Shipping Act, the Court noted, applies a different standard to practices designed to injure a competitor. A conference may not "resort to any other discriminatory or unfair methods" against an independent, but the conference
may enter into agreements which the Board may properly approve as long as
they are not "unjustly discriminatory" or "unjustly prejudicial" with respect to
shippers. The addition of the modifier "unjustly" was explained by Isbrandtsen
as a direction to the Board that it may approve some discrimination against
shippers but no discrimination by a conference against an'independent. 116
Recent lower court railroad cases offer another basis for distinguishing an
antitrust action by an independent. In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v.
Aircoacl TransportAss'n," 7 decided by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia the same week Isbrandtsenwas handed down, it was held that the district court need not refer to the ICC the issue whether a rate quotation was made
as part of a combination or conspiracy to eliminate a competitor. The court suggested that it would be possible for the district court to hold a special hearing
to determine the predatory nature of the rate agreement. Subsequently, the
same court in Atlantic CoastLine R. Co. v. Riss & Co.n5 interpreted Isbrandtsen
as requiring that the issue of the intent and effect of an agreement must be
referred to the regulatory agency "where such issue is the sole or dominant
115"Primary jurisdiction may be part of a deliberate delay to exhaust plaintiff's finances."
Testimony of Walton Hamilton, Hearings, Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of
the House judicial Committee, on H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.Part I, p. 290-91 (1949).
Compare the added burden to the private litigant contending with primary jurisdiction
with the policy of section 5 of the Clayton Act. Note 76 supra. "... Congress itself has placed
the private antitrust litigant in a most favorable position through the enactment of §5 of the
Clayton Act.... In the face of such a policy this Court should not add requirements to burden
the privatelitigant beyond what is specifically set forth by Congress in those laws." Radovich
v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957).
"' Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 495 (1958).
17 253 F.2d 877 (App.D.C., 1958).
11 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 69,122 (App.D.C., 1958) (petition for cert. granted and case
remanded).
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issue in the case." But, "where the agreement is only one of a considerable number of overt acts alleged and where the policy favoring referral is clearly outweighed by other factors such as the probability of undue delay and the overriding importance of early consideration of the overt acts alleged," referral to
the Board need not be made.' 9 This rule, it seems, would ordinarily apply in
favor of the independent in an antitrust suit. Likewise, the rule ordinarily
would seem not to apply to antitrust actions by shippers. The shipper charging
disciminatory rates will put into evidence the rate charged and what he believes
should have been the appropriate non-discriminatory rate. The independent on
the other hand will generally allege many examples of the conduct of conference
members. All the allegations taken together are designed to show, largely
through a cumulative presentation of circumstantial evidence, that there does
in fact exist such a conspiracy and that the plaintiff has been or will be injured
by it. It will be an unusual predatory agreement that consists exclusively of a
rate practice. The Court of Appeals formulated this rule without mention of
Cinard. In that case the independent entered a variety of allegations against
the conference which he declared were examples of the conspiracy. 12 But the
court insisted on treating the complaint as if it had alleged no more than an unlawful rate system.
Thus, it would appear that a court has its choice of several theories to avoid
the results of Cunard, Terminal and FarEast.It may refuse to refer any unfiled
agreement by following the precedents set out in Borden and Alkali. 2' It may
decide that IsbrandtsenCo. v. UnitedStates altered the needfor the Cunardprocedure in that non-filing can no longer be justified by the reliance of the conference
on Board inactivity with respect to the "cover of authority" policy of the Board.
The court may reason from FederalMaritimeBoard v. IsbrandtsenCo. 22 to a presumption of the predatory nature of the agreement from the fact of its not being
filed. Or, the court may adopt judge Forman's view, which apparently has been
revived recently in Aircoach, that the exemption provision of the regulatory
statutes applies only to the technical rate-setting practices in the industry. Two
further theories are still left. The court may adopt the distinction between
independent and shipper. If there are many allegations the result reached in Riss
may be employed. If the allegations are few and call for Board consideration,
then reasoning from Isbrandtsen the court may stay the antitrust proceedings
to determine the single question of the predatory nature of the agreement. This
procedure could be employed without dismissal and in a manner analogous to a
court utilizing the superior fact-finding capacity of a master. No exhaustion of
remedies need follow such limited referral.
19Ibid. Accord: Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, 155
F.Supp. 768 (E.D.Pa., 1957); Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 144 F.Supp. 480 (N.D.Ill.,
1956).
"2

See note 9 supra.

"2

See note 67 supra.

'

356 U.S. 481 (1958).
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III
To the three questions posed by the R.C.A. case as important considerations in
applying primary jurisdiction, several tentative answers may now be proposed.
It does not appear to have been the intent of Congress to supersede the antitrust laws by the Shipping Act and thereby render antitrust inapplicable to
shipping. On the contrary, the antitrust laws can serve to loose the power of
the conference to limit independent competition. Competition with the conferences by tramps and independents operating as part liners and part tramps appears as intended by Congress to insure that the conferences would be unable
to charge differing rates for similar service to various classes of shippers under
the guise of uniform rates.
Although the shipping industry is heavily regulated, there is room for arguing the applicability of antitrust when the combination sought to be regulated
in return for exemption from antitrust does not submit to the form of regulation.
Although Cunard and FarEast early took a position that failure to file is irrelevant, the rule of those cases has slowly been whittled away by doctrines tightly
encompassing those cases. In areas of regulated transportation other than shipping, rationales have been suggested to avoid the results of Cunard and Far
East. Although shipping cases have most closely followed the rule of Cunard,
FederalMaritime Board v. IsbrandtsenCo. was a severe set-back for the conferences. That case appears to foreshadow less deference to the Board in the future.
It is with respect to the issue of rates that primary jurisdiction in the shipping
industry appears to remain a requisite. Where rates are concerned the jurisdiction of the Board is difficult to deny. In this area the agencies have been regarded as particularly competent since the first transportation commission was
established. Thus, the resolution of Cunard still applies as to strict questions of
rates. But in the context of the antitrust suit the Board's jurisdiction over rates
has not escaped attack. The strongest assault has been by way of re-interpreting
the nature of the Board's power to exempt. Advocates of this view would reduce the regulatory exemption provision so that only technical rate-setting
agreements are covered by the exemption. Should the Supreme Court eventually adopt this argument, the Maritime Board in particular would be-stripped of
power since, unlike other commissions, it has no authority to set rates.
A more indirect attack on the Board's jurisdiction over rates lies in the distinction between independent and shipper and the related distinction between
the sole or dominant rate allegation and the rate allegation as one of many
charges. The inherent danger in this approach is that the court may make too
much turn on the allegations. Such a doctrine would appear to tempt plaintiffs
to pad their complaints so as to avoid referral to the Board. Where this occurs,
the court may adjudicate the merits only to find that referral to the Board
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should have been made initially.u 3 However, there appears to be a question of
possible costly and protracted delay whichever way the court decides. If it refers
to the Board, the independent may be injured by the delay. If it doesn't, the
conference may be harmed. But in a balance of interests it would seem as if
greater consideration is due the independent. Since the plaintiff will be in court
only where there is an unfiled agreement, at any time before or during the antitrust proceedings, the conference is free to file with the Board. If on the other
hand the conference denies the existence of a predatory agreement, then the
plaintiff who is presumably ready, willing and able to prove such an agreement
before the court should not be forced to prove it before the agency, as the principal reason for referral would be to secure a possible exemption for the agreement.
As a practical matter the court, it would seem, may safely assume that the conference knows the requirements of the Board. 124 Having assumed the risks of
non-filing, the conference should not be thus able to retrace their steps and seek
approval only when the antitrust suit is upon them.'25 Retroactive immunity in
this form results in the anomaly that violation of the Shipping Act provides at
least temporary immunity from the antitrust laws.
With respect to an admitted agreement involving rates, Isbrandtsen in dictum admits the necessity of preliminary Board consideration. But this referral,
it is noted, is minimal. It is to be made for findings of fact as to the nature of
the agreement. However, Isbrandtsen did not face the situation where the
answer of the Board would be obvious to the court. It may be that courts in the
future will be inclined to dispense with primary jurisdiction in such situations
even as to question of rate practices.2 6
The respective roles of antitrust and maritime regulation ultimately rest on
broad considerations of policy. Primary jurisdiction as a doctrine suitable for
adjusting the shifting economic preferences of courts and Congress is at present
13 'Tut it is urged... that the assertion by the district court of its jurisdiction, without
awaiting an investigation by the Commission, will entail protracted litigation and impose on
the parties great expense before the error can be corrected on appeal from the final judgment
of this Court." United States Alkali Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 201 (1945). See also,
Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1124-25 (1953).
'2 In Hazard's Adm'r v. New England Marine Ins. Co., 8 Pet. (U.S.) 557, 581-82 (1834),
the Court held that maritime underwriters are presumed to know the usages of the trade.
2
1 1 United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. [68,872 (D.Utah,
1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 950 (1958).
21The findings of fact in a determination as to the predatory nature of an agreement presumably include actual elimination of competitors, and the manner of such elimination. Courts
may ultimately rely on the holding of American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781
(1946), to dispense with even this limited referral. The Court there held that actual exclusion
of competitors is not necessary for a showing of antitrust violation. "It is not the form of the
combination or the particular means used but the result to be achieved that the statute condemns." Id., at 809. Part reliance was placed on this aspect of American Tobacco in Slick Airway, Inc. v. American Airlines, 107 F.Supp. 199 (D.N.J., 1952), and Riss & Co. v. Association of American Railroads, 170 F.Supp. 354, 363-64 (D.D.C., 1959).
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in a state of flux. With the post-war energetic enforcement of antitrust by the
Department of Justice, the Supreme Court in cases such as Isbrandtsen and
R.C.A. has appeared to shy away from the agencies in matters relating to antitrust. A related tendency is the resolution of formerly divergent regulatory and
antitrust policies in favor of the policy of greater competition via the road of
judicial review.12 7 Also, a growing antipathy by the Supreme Court to exclusive
arrangements has been evident.us One must admit the present primacy of
antitrust over regulation. But to the extent that the Court is willing to overturn
former precedents, primary jurisdiction in antitrust suits will be a rapidly
changing doctrine. This may be especially true in the shipping industry where
regulation by the Maritime Board has had its strongest hold.
127

E.g., United States v. R.C.A., 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
E.g., Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 1 (1958); Denver Union Stock
Yard Co. v. Producers Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 356 U.S. 282 (1958); Standard Oil Co. of
California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
"2

AN ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STANDING BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT TO ATTACK THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION
The Supreme Court has often invoked the rule that a public official has no
standing to attack the constitutionality of legislation which he is charged with
enforcing.' While this general rule appears well established, it is not clear
whether an attorney general, as contrasted with other public officials, is in all
cases within the scope of the rule. This issue was raised, but not reached,
during the Court's 1958 term in Alaska v. American Can Co.,2 in which the
Alaska Attorney:General attacked the constitutionality of an Alaska statute as
construed by the lower courts.' The purpose of this comment is to examine this
question and see in what situations, if any, an attorney general, state or federal,
should have standing before the Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality of legislation of his own jurisdiction. 4
I Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14 (1915); Braxton County Court v. West Virginia,
208 U.S. 192 (1908); Smith v. Indiana, 191 U.S. 138 (1903); Caffery v. Oklahoma Territory,
177 U.S. 346 (1900). See also, the separate opinion of justice Frankfurter in Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939); The Power of a State Officer to Raise a Constitutional Question,
33 Col. L. Rev. 1036 (1933).
2358 U.S. 224 (1959).
Brief for Petitioner at 11.
4 The scope of this comment is limited to those cases where an attorney general attacks acts
of his own legislature. It is a quite different question, and well settled, that an attorney general,
in the name of his government, may question the constitutionality of legislation of another
government. See United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 21 F.Supp. 645 (S.D.Cal.,
1937) (federal versus state legislation); Ohio v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (state
versus another state's legislation); Hopkins Savings Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935) (state
versus federal legislation); cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).

